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Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: 
A Response to Professor Ladeur*
Sujith Xavier**
Abstract
Professor Ladeur argues that administrative law’s postmodernism (and by extension Global 
Administrative Law) necessitates that we move beyond relying on ideas of delegation, account-
ability and legitimacy. Global Governance, particularly Global Administrative Law and Global 
Constitutionalism, should try to adapt and experiment with the changing nature of the postmod-
ern legality and support the creation of norms that will adapt to the complexities of globalisation. 
Ladeur’s contestation, similar to GAL’s propositions, can be challenged. By taking the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, a significant contributor to the field of international criminal law, 
as an example, it is suggested that the creation of networks that Ladeur makes visible may not 
account for ‘regulatory capture’. This paper will argue that from the outside, the proliferation of 
networks may suggest that spontaneous accountability is possible. A closer look, however, drawing 
on anthropological insights from the ICTR, reveals that international institutions are suscepti-
ble to capture by special interests. Furthermore, there are two central themes that animate the 
response to Professor Ladeur: the political nature of international institutions and the history of 
international law, and the role of institutions in this history. 
INTRODUCTION 
The multiplication of international and transnational interactions in recent years has 
prompted a reimaging of the global order. This new image reflects the dense web of 
inchoate regulatory regimes, actors, norms and processes,1 rather than the simple 
* Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and Transnational Regulation’, this 
volume.
** BA, LLB (Law and Human Rights), LLM, PhD (Cand), Senior Fellow, Critical Research Laboratory in Law 
& Society/Graduate Fellow, Nathanson Centre For Crime, Human Rights and Security, York University & 
Student-at-Law (2013), Jackman and Associates, Toronto, Canada. I would like to thank Amar Bhatia, Igor 
Gontcharov, Mazen Masri, Shanthi Senthe and Peer Zumbansen for their insightful comments. All errors 
are mine.
1 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Law, Evolving’ in Jan M Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2012) 898. 
(2012) 3(3) TLT 268–284DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/20414005.3.3.268
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intercourse between sovereign states. The task of mapping, describing and theorising 
different networks and webs is difficult, complicated and, often, politically contested. 
In this context, there is a surge in scholarship that conceptualises Global Governance 
through the lens of, for example, constitutional law,2 transnational law,3 legal pluralism4 
and, more recently, administrative law.5 
Professor Ladeur demonstrates Global Administrative Law’s (GAL’s) utility whilst 
simultaneously providing incisive adjustments to its central tenets.6 Ladeur argues 
that administrative law’s (and, by extension, GAL’s) postmodernism necessitates that 
we move beyond relying on ideas of delegation, accountability and legitimacy. Global 
Governance, particularly GAL and Global Constitutionalism, should try to adapt and 
experiment with the changing nature of postmodern legality and support the creation of 
norms that will adapt to the complexities of globalisation. Ladeur’s contestation, similar 
to GAL’s propositions, can be challenged. By taking the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR)—a significant contributor to the field of international criminal 
law—as an example, it is suggested that the creation of networks that Ladeur makes vis-
ible may not account for ‘regulatory capture’. This paper will argue that from the outside, 
the proliferation of networks may suggest that spontaneous accountability is possible. 
A closer look, however, drawing on anthropological insights from the ICTR, reveals 
that international institutions are susceptible to capture by special interests. Moreover, 
there are two central themes that animate the response to Professor Ladeur: the political 
nature of international institutions, and the history of international law and the role of 
institutions in this history. In what follows, I will briefly describe Ladeur’s central argu-
ments and situate these claims vis-à-vis the already complicated but burgeoning body 
of scholarship on GAL. Thereafter the analysis will draw on empirical studies from the 
ICTR to suggest that networks (in this instance international criminal justice institu-
tions) are susceptible to capture by special interests. 
2 Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutional-
ization of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009); Ronald St John Macdonald and Douglas M 
Johnston, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2005); Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes’ (2009) 
16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 621. But see José E Alvarez, ‘The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) 
Truths and Consequences’ (2003) 38(3) Texas International Law Journal 421.
3 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Legal Pluralism’ (2010) 1(2) Transnational Legal Theory 141.
4 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
5 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ 
(2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15; Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global 
Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 European Jour-
nal of International Law 1; Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance’ 
(2005) ASIL Proceedings 143; Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law’ 
(2009) 20(1) European Journal of International Law 23.
6 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and Transnational Regulation’, this 
volume, 245–9.
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LADEUR’S EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GAL 
Professor Ladeur’s contribution seeks to confront the recent attempts in global 
governance to map and shape7 the existing international legal order based on our under-
standing of the nation state. For example, Global Constitutionalism scholars use the 
nation state as a potential solution to the legitimacy crisis. Global Constitutionalism 
and the search for unity is an attempt to bring the formality of the state to the interna-
tional scale as a potential mechanism for the ‘startlingly facile resolution of conflict[s] 
and contestation[s]’.8 Yet given the fragmentation of private and public spheres and the 
transformation of the legal system, which undoubtedly affect our conceptions of demo-
cratic governance, Ladeur suggests that GAL may provide a much more meaningful way 
to manage and stabilise the complexities of the emerging regimes. The focus should 
therefore turn to the ‘fragmented like character of law as it is’.9 In particular there ought 
to be greater reflection on the self-construction and auto-constitution of the legal order 
in international legal theory.10 
Ladeur tests his hypothesis by considering the ‘evolution of modern administrative 
law’ to examine how progress in this field can help us to understand domestic, transna-
tional and global law. One of the central tenets is that ‘administration’, rather than the 
legislators and courts, produce domestic administrative law. Ladeur thus suggests that 
the paradigms of administrative law have undergone serious changes over the last decade 
from ‘constructing and deciding individual “cases” to industry-related “regulation”’.11 
There is a new postmodern model of administrative action that is motivated by experi-
mentation and learning, reflecting the transformation of culture. The proliferation of 
different forms of communication and the rise of information technology have man-
aged to break down existing modes of communication. The change in communication 
has resulted in specialised epistemic communities and highly specialised networks, or a 
society of networks.12 
Within this postmodern reality, the role of the state has been dramatically altered, 
yet the state has not lost its relevance. The state does not retreat or vanish. Rather it has 
assumed the ‘role of a player with the responsibility for the rules of the game’ to regu-
late the ‘polycentric practices of experimentation in the “private” realm [which] produce 
lock-ins as well as perverse effects’.13 Based on this societal transformation, Ladeur 
7 Mattias Kumm et al, ‘Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 
1(1) Global Constitutionalism 1.
8 Ladeur (n 6) 256.
9 Ibid, 244.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Constitutionalism and the State of the “Society of Networks”: The Design of a New 
“Control Project” for a Fragmented Legal System’ (2011) 2(4) Transnational Legal Theory 463.
13 Ladeur (n 6) 239.
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theorises a new perspective for GAL as a possibility. The network-like character of trans-
national administrative law is not new, rather it is a continuation ‘of the fragmentation 
and, as a consequence, the increasingly loose coupling of the different layers of the nor-
mative system of postmodernity which can be observed at the domestic level’.14 Once we 
understand that the domestic system is not structured by a unified normative order, it is 
much easier to fathom its expansion to the international and transnational levels. 
Ladeur’s arguments thus far seem somewhat different from the central tenets of GAL. 
GAL’s central goal is to deploy administration as Global Governance. Such a positioning 
allows those working under the auspice of GAL to ‘recast many standard concerns about 
the legitimacy of international institutions in a more specific and focused way’.15 This 
approach, the supporters of GAL argue, enables the unsettling of orthodox understand-
ings of the concept of law within the transnational space. 
If GAL is to describe law in the international setting, Kingsbury suggests, then it is 
a claim that ‘diverges from, and can be sharply in tension with the classical models of 
consent-based inter-state international law and most models of national law’.16 He then 
elucidates the concept of law that is implicated within GAL, which takes on a transna-
tional character, uprooted from the nation state. Within this context, GAL is something 
that is wholly different from administrative law found within national jurisdictions. 
National administrative law is a product of political compromises between legitimate 
political actors, whilst international law emanates from a dizzying array of actors and 
norm producers.
Such an account is in contrast to Ladeur’s conceptualisation of the evolutionary 
process shaping domestic notions of law and resulting in overlapping and intercon-
nected dimensions in the production of the legal order. Ladeur, unlike other supporters 
of GAL, suggests that the democratic nature of law should not be over-emphasised. Prior 
to the development of postmodern administrative law, arguably a direct link could be 
made between law’s accountability to its democratic constituents and its goals. Moreover 
Ladeur notes that within the context of domestic administrative governance, account-
ability cannot be reduced ‘to the control of compliance rules’.17 The postmodern nature 
of society has thus had a fundamental effect on the relationship between law and ‘its 
cognitive infrastructure’, precipitating the evolution of the legal system with the creation 
of new accountability regimes called ‘entangled hierarchies’.18 These are characterised by 
the erosion between the design of the rules and their application. As a direct result, there 
is the emergence of spontaneous accountability generated by networks. These regimes 
are not defined in advance but rather are constituted through a process of network activ-
14 Ibid, 245.
15 Kingsbury 2009 (n 5) 27.
16 Ibid.
17 Ladeur (n 6) 255.
18 Ibid, 253.
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ity. The control mechanisms conceptualised at the state level cannot help in this instance 
and thus a reconfiguration is necessary. 
The notion that law must have a public law element, particularly in light of post-
modern insights, may also seem misleading. The postmodern nature of law, given the 
rise of the society of organisations and then networks,19 necessitated that administrative 
law adapt and give way to new explicit ‘reformulations and remodellings of the entire 
architecture of the normative system’.20 In a similar vein, questions about ‘lawness’ of 
GAL must take stock of the changing nature of domestic law within the postmodern 
moment. Thus for Ladeur there are striking similarities between domestic and transna-
tional administrative law which undoubtedly have an effect on the way we conceptualise 
GAL. 
The democratic deficit in international organisations is one of GAL’s central moti-
vators. Ladeur argues that such a perspective is overstated. By taking a sharp look at the 
democratic function of law, Ladeur argues that the role of the state at times requires 
interfering with individual rights where parliamentary oversight is necessary. Simultane-
ously, the state is involved in norm creation which ‘transform[s] the conditions for the 
use of rights but do[es] not infringe upon subjective rights in the traditional sense’.21 
Thus the new addressees of administrative action are more and more complex networks. 
The rise of global administrative structures and the fast emerging norms that regulate 
these networks subsequently strengthen the ‘autonomy of administrative function’. In 
this sense, global law must be thought of in procedural terms (‘as a law which produces 
its own preconditions for validity and recognition, beyond the sphere of the state’)22 that 
is part and parcel of a fragmented context which is ‘characterised by a random coming 
together of national, conventional international and self‐organised global law, on the
one hand, and similarly heterogeneous cognitive rules [on the other]’.
Ladeur’s GAL can therefore draw on ‘components of both the more hybrid loosely 
coupled type of the law of networks, which emerges at the domestic level, and on com-
ponents of the new public international law which shatters the hitherto established clear 
separation from the state-based law’.23 Fundamentally, the source of law can no longer 
be viewed as stemming from canonical texts. Instead, Ladeur suggests that legal mean-
ing must be generated from several overlapping texts and practices which encompasses 
an ‘experimental approach’ that includes both domestic and transnational contexts. He 
uses different examples (from investment protection and environmental governance) to 
suggest that in these fields, GAL may allow ‘for the development of rules below the rather 
rigid structure of public international law’.24
19 Ladeur (n 12). 
20 Ladeur (n 6) 257.
21 Ibid, 252.
22 Ibid, 253.
23 Ibid, 247.
24 Ibid, 264.
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This account, however, does not demonstrate the role of special interests (or nar-
row interest) in the evolutionary process in society.25 Ladeur, while noting and taking 
stock of the dynamic shifts within the domestic and national accounts of administration, 
does not illustrate glimpses of ‘who’s in and who’s out’ in this process that describes the 
move from cases to regulation. Ladeur’s version of the evolutionary process within the 
national narratives of specific fields of law, as a move away from the legislators and the 
judges to one that is governed by networks, simply omits to mention the embedded 
power structures within and amongst these networks that is reflected in contemporary 
societal structures.26 
Ladeur is correct in identifying the rise of networks, but this does not necessar-
ily imply that these networks are impregnable to regulatory capture by special interest 
groups or narrow interests. For international relations theorists, regulatory capture 
denotes the control of the ‘regulatory process by those whom it is supposed to regulate’ 
or by a small group of those affected by regulation, ‘with the consequence that regulatory 
outcomes favor the narrow “few” at the expense of society as a whole’.27 Similar to the 
realist accounts of the common law legal framework’s partiality for large-scale capitalist 
American economy of the nineteenth century28 and critical international law scholars’ 
use of history to trace international law’s complicity in colonialism,29 universalist char-
acterisations of Global Governance devoid of interdisciplinary insights about the nature 
of globalisation must be challenged. 
Ladeur may be accurate in identifying the global administrative space and its ability 
to generate self-regulation (as a form of spontaneous accountability). Accountability, 
however, is tied to specific biases endemic in those interests that have captured the 
spontaneous accountability producing mechanisms.30 For example, the United Nations 
Security Council’s attempts to deliver justice and end impunity in the former Balkans 
and Rwanda led to the creation of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals. 
25 W Mattli and N Woods, ‘In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics’ in Walter 
Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 5; 
David Charney, ‘Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in Contractual Relationships’ (1996) 144 Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 1841; Patricia J Williams, Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law 
Professor (Harvard University Press, 1991).
26 Charney, ibid.
27 Mattli and Woods (n 25) 14. 
28 Roscoe Pound, ‘A Call for a Realist Jurisprudence’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 697; Felix Cohen, 
‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 809; Elizabeth 
Mensch, ‘The History of Mainstream Legal Thought’ in David Kairys (ed), The Politics of Law: A Progressive 
Critique (Pantheon, 1998) 21.
29 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2004).
30 David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Rul-
ing the World; Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 
2009).
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These tribunals have nonetheless been captured by special interests31 bent on prosecut-
ing those most responsible for the heinous crimes, even in cases where there is a clear 
lack of evidentiary basis to proceed.32 Moreover, and building on the political nature 
of spontaneous accountability creation, insights from a historical perspective of inter-
national law demonstrate the use of international law to universalise a specific set of 
values and traditions.33 Such insights reveal that international law is not neutral in how 
it operates. Rather, there are embedded politics that are prevalent within the structure 
of international law.34 ICTR witness testimony is an illustrative example in which there 
is regulatory capture by interests that want to facilitate and expedite the prosecutions 
of alleged perpetrators of international crimes, which may be analogous to the use of 
international law to further colonial expansion and imperialism as witnessed through 
the civilising mission. Particularly when the objectivity of adjudicators, litigators and 
witnesses is pried open and interrogated, there seems to be a marked absence of under-
standing and accurate interpretation of witness testimony that supports the decisions 
rendered. 
Ladeur’s contribution seeks to clarify and add to a central feature of GAL, as concep-
tualised thus far by its proponents. The primary concern raised above of who’s in and 
who’s out nonetheless remains. In what follows, ICTR will be presented as an example 
of Ladeur’s self-organised network which was forged by those who were part of the new 
network of judges, UN officials and other stakeholders (civil society activists and gov-
ernment officials, amongst others) in trying to stop impunity. By taking the ICTR as an 
example, this paper will demonstrate that these networks are susceptible to capture, both 
by institutional bias and by political interests that run deep within the very structure 
of international law.35 Professor Ladeur’s insights are a significant contribution to the 
existing GAL literature. Such insights must, however, take account of the rise of special 
interests, particularly in light of the rise of the knowledge society, if they are to depict the 
ascertainable reality within the international institutions.36 
31 Elena A Baylis, ‘Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies’ (2008) 10 Oregon Review of Inter-
national Law 361.
32 Nancy A Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International 
Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
33 Anghie (n 29).
34 Makau Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 31; Antony 
Anghie, ‘What is TWAIL: Comment’ (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 39; 
Obiora C Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, 
or Both?’ (2010) 10 International Community Law Review 37; JT Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its 
Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography’ (2011) 3(1) Trade, Law & Development 
26. 
35 Anghie (n 29); Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the 
Politics of Universality (Oxford University Press, 2011).
36 Samuel Moyn, ‘Judith Shklar on the Philosophy of International Criminal Law’ (2012), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148437 (accessed 19 December 2012).
275Theorising Global Governance Inside Out
ICTR: AN EXAMPLE OF ‘SPONTANEOUS ACCOUNTABILITY’? 
The nascent field of international criminal law has progressed by leaps and bounds. 
The ICTR37 was one of the first international criminal institutions to be established by 
the United Nations Security Council through its Chapter VII Charter powers to main-
tain peace and security.38 The creation of this institution was made possible by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The long struggle of the 
international human rights movement(s)39 to create legal mechanisms to enforce the 
applicable international criminal law that had evolved through state practice and cus-
tom made a significant contribution to the creation of this institution. The networks 
of international human rights movement(s), along with sympathetic Member States of 
the United Nations, worked hard to fill, based on their political and ideological perspec-
tives, the accountability gap for mass human rights violations. The ICTR (as set out in 
the respective resolution40) sought to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for 
the violation of international humanitarian law, to render justice to the victims, to deter 
future crimes, and to restore peace by ending impunity in the region.41 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created prior to the ICTR, but 
in a similar manner. 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East were the first international criminal fora for prosecuting war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes committed during armed conflict. 
Since then, numerous international criminal legal doctrines have been forged to combat 
impunity (such as the crime of genocide42 and more recently the crime of aggression43). 
The creation of these two international ad hoc mechanisms paved the way for an inter-
national criminal court.44 In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly established 
the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. 
The Committee, within two years, drafted the Statute and in July 1998 the Statute was 
adopted by 120 votes to seven. The Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. Simultane-
ously, there were numerous other special international mechanisms created to tackle the 
37 R Lee, ‘The Rwanda Tribunal’ (1996) 9 Leiden Journal of International Law 37. The Rwandan tribunal 
shares the appeal chamber and the prosecutor with the ICTY. 
38 United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, 39 AJIL 190 Supp (entered into force 24 October 1945).
39 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010).
40 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, UNSCOR, 3217th Meeting, S/RES/827 (1993); United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 955, UNSCOR, 49th Session, 3453rd Meeting, UN Doc S/RES/955 
(1994). 
41 Sarah Williams, ‘ICTY and ICTR (Completion Strategy)’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2009) 362–3.
42 Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [1951] ICJ Rep 
1951.
43 Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2012).
44 Ibid, 48.
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growing demand for international justice. For example, the Special Panels for Serious 
Crime for East Timor (SPSC), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordi-
nary Chamber in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) were created between 1999 and 2007. The SPSC was set up through the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, while the United Nations and the 
respective governments of Sierra Leone and Cambodia created the SCSL and ECCC. The 
UN Security Council established the STL using its Charter powers. As these international 
criminal institutions mete out judgments, the politics of international criminal justice 
is becoming evident, particularly as it relates to who is selected for prosecution. More-
over, the development of procedural law within these institutions points to the political 
nature of international prosecutions, which is further embedded within the politics of 
international law.
The statutes of the ICTY and ICTR respectively require the judges to draft and adopt 
Rules of Evidence and Procedure (REP) for the ‘conduct of the pre-trial phase of the 
proceedings, trials and appeals, the admissions of evidence, the protection of victims 
and witness and other appropriate matters’.45 Moreover, the ICTR Statute enables it to 
adopt the REP of the ICTY.46 ICTY judges, in drafting the rules, included a provision 
that allowed for amendments to the rules based on the day-to-day needs of the tribunal. 
This practice has evolved and has culminated in a streamlined process through the Rules 
Committee.47 Proposal for amendments are made by Judges, the Prosecutor and/or the 
Registrar and these amendments can be adopted at the plenary meeting of the Tribunal 
(closed sessions) or unanimously adopted with the approval of the Permanent Judges. 
The REP may illustrate Ladeur’s ideas of the self-regulating network that is able to gener-
ate its own form of accountability. 
Focusing on the issue of witness testimony, the Rules Committee has amended and 
revised on numerous occasions the rules relating to the standard of admitting evidence 
and witness testimony generally. Yet empirical evidence from the field suggests that these 
changes to the rules have not been successful, either in terms of flexibility or expedi-
tious trials or—more importantly—in protecting the rights of the accused.48 Rather, the 
anomalies reported by insights from the field may be attributable to the flexible nature 
of the rules and the role of the judges.49 The discussion below will use empirical evi-
45 Art 15 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, UNSCOR, 3217th Meeting, S/RES/827 (1993).
46 Art 14 United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, UNSCOR, 49th Session, 3453rd Meeting, UN Doc 
S/RES/955 (1994).
47 Megan A Fairlie, ‘Rulemaking from the Bench: A Place for Minimalism at the ICTY’ (2003–4) 39 Texas 
International Law Journal 262.
48 Mazimo Langer and Joseph W Doherty, ‘Managerial Judging Goes International but its Promise Remains 
Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY Reforms’ (2011) 36(2) Yale Journal of International Law 
242.
49 Combs (n 32); Kamari M Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenges 
of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Tim Kelsall, Culture under 
Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press, 
2009).
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dence from the ICTR to show that spontaneous legitimacy is not possible, given the 
pro-conviction bias of the tribunal. On the heels of this discussion, the paper will turn to 
explore the regulatory capture of transnational criminal space by special interest groups 
that seek to end impunity, even though adequate evidence to substantiate the rationale 
for conviction is lacking. 
LOCATING THE CULTURAL LOCAL: WITNESS TESTIMONY  
IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE
Recent studies have made available divergent accounts of how the ICTR functions. In 
this regard, what emerges from within is in stark contrast to claims to spontaneous 
accountability endemic in networks as suggested by Ladeur. The networks that Ladeur 
chooses (investment protection regimes and environmental governance50) bear strik-
ing resemblances to the international criminal justice networks described earlier. My 
assertion is premised on the culture and context in which this institution operates. The 
central concern is the inability of witnesses to accurately convey their stories to the trier 
of fact. This inability stems from the specific culture of Rwanda and its colonial past.51 
Moreover, the use of the adjudicatory process is an imposition of Western understand-
ings of how to conduct investigations and trials and elicit witness testimony, which may 
diverge from the local customs and conceptions of the people involved.52 
Nancy Combs reviews the transcripts of witness testimony from the ICTR.53 She 
points to a systematic hurdle that has plagued the institution: how to grapple with 
local witnesses? More relevantly, she demonstrates that there is a direct disjuncture 
between evidence that is provided by witnesses and the adjudicatory process. ‘In sum, 
Trial Chambers often seem content to base convictions on highly problematic witness 
testimony.’54 As a result, the Chambers fail to find ‘reasonable doubt in some of the most 
doubtful instances and as a consequence, convict just about every defendant who comes 
before them’.55 Through a painstaking review of trial transcripts, Combs identifies that 
witnesses are often unable to provide detailed accounts of the dates, times and specific 
location of the events or, more importantly, place the perpetrator accurately at the scene 
of the crime. Combs notes that these discrepancies are a result of educational, cultural 
and translation related factors. 
50 Ladeur (n 6).
51 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and Genocide in Rwanda (Prince-
ton University Press, 2002).
52 Combs (n 32) 3.
53 Ibid, 4.
54 Ibid, 222.
55 Ibid; Importantly, Combs suggests that the judges are not ‘convicting innocent defendants’. Rather what she 
is suggesting is ‘that the Trial Chambers’ cavalier attitude towards fact finding impediments is inconsistent 
with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof as that standard is traditionally understood’.
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In our understanding of domestic criminal prosecutions, witnesses called in to 
testify are expected to provide a detailed account of who did what to whom. Scholars 
working in domestic criminal law, however, have pointed out that witness testimony is 
deeply flawed because of numerous insights, particularly from race, gender and mental 
health angles.56 Comparative criminal law suggests that certain national jurisdictions 
are protective of the rights of the accused and thus prohibit the use of the death penalty 
in cases that rely solely on eyewitness testimony.57 Examples from specific jurisdictions 
in the United States illustrate that each State must produce DNA evidence, which can be 
buttressed by witness testimony in order to avail of the death penalty.58 Such insights 
into the unreliability of witness testimony have yet to find their way into international 
criminal law. 
Within international criminal law debates, the primary focus has been on the 
substantive legality of international criminal adjudication. The literature thus far has 
concentrated on setting out and developing specific areas of substantive international 
criminal law.59 Even though there are numerous accounts of problematic features of 
institutional practices from defence counsel60 and academics with specific institutional 
knowledge of international mechanisms,61 and interdisciplinary insights from political 
scientists and anthropologists,62 the focus on the mechanics of the institutions, espe-
cially as they relate to international criminal procedure, is minimal.63 There are various 
calls to incorporate diversity into the existing framework64 and criticisms of the prob-
lematic nature of admitting faulty evidence;65 nonetheless, very little attention is paid 
to the critical insights emerging from domestic criminal jurisdictions with regard to 
witness testimony. 
56 David M Tanovich, ‘The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial Injustice in the 
Canadian Criminal Justice System’ (2008) 40 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 655; David M Tanovich, 
‘Moving Beyond “Driving While Black”: Race, Suspect Description and Selection’ (2005) 36 Ottawa Law 
Review 315; Sandra G Thompson, ‘Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony’ (2011) 
University of Houston Law Center No 2011-A-8.
57 Thompson, ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 See eg M Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Transnational Press, 2004); Antonio 
Cassese (ed), Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2009); Antonio 
Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003); Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
60 Wayne Jordash, ‘The Practice of “Witness Proofing” in International Criminal Tribunals: Why the 
International Criminal Court should Prohibit the Practice’ (2009) Leiden Journal of International Law 22.
61 Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford University 
Press, 2009).
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65 Alexander Zahar, ‘The Problem of False Testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ in 
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The rationale behind the absence of this type of analysis is twofold. First, unlike 
the Nuremberg Tribunal Prosecutors, who relied exclusively on documents prepared by 
Nazi officials to establish guilt, ICTR prosecutors rely exclusively on witness testimony.66 
Modern day international criminals, especially those indicted by the ICTR, did not leave 
a trail of documentary evidence that could be used by the Prosecution. Secondly, the REP 
of the ad hoc tribunals were drafted and amended by the judges, prosecutors and other 
officials of the tribunals. The conversations have therefore focused on the institutional 
and meritorious aspects of the REP and the degree to which common law and civil law 
traditions have influenced the development of these rules.67 Ultimately the exclusion of 
critical insights from the domestic context, which questions the viability of using witness 
testimony, were left out or ignored. The role of experts in this development is significant. 
Even though ICTR witnesses understand that the Rwandan President’s plane was 
shot down on 6 April 1994, precipitating the genocide (the most significant date for the 
Tribunal), they are not able to place perpetrators at the scene of the crime on a specific 
date. The rationale is simply cultural. Some witnesses cannot relay events based on the 
Western calendar, or they lack formal western-style education to respond to questions 
about specific dates and times. The prosecutors and most international staff conducting 
the investigations, trials and legal research are western.68 For example, in the Nahimana 
proceedings, a trial witness testified that Colonel Rwendeye had attended two death-
squad meetings in 1993–4. When the witness was confronted with evidence that the 
Colonel had in fact died in 1990, the witness rejected the evidence and maintained that 
the Colonel had in fact died in 1992. ‘When it was pointed out that the [witness’s] revi-
sion nonetheless made [the Colonel] the only dead man at the meetings, [the witness] 
claimed that he had testified that the meetings had taken place at the end of 1992 and 
1993.’69 
More importantly, and often, witnesses use cultural practices to identify events (for 
example, the seasons determine the time of year). These practices are culturally specific 
and contingent. Similarly, the notion of temporality or temporal sequences of events is 
arguably another issue of contention, where witnesses are unable to provide the exact 
timeline along which the alleged incitement to genocide occurred. 
Problematically, the judges of the Tribunal have proceeded to accept ‘faulty wit-
ness testimonies’ for compelling reasons. Often the accused perpetrators were clearly 
66 Combs (n 32) 6.
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involved in the Rwandan genocide given their political affiliations, which is the central 
basis for conviction. The judges rely on these factors to credit witness testimonies. There 
is an 85 per cent conviction rate in the ICTR, which clearly corroborates Combs’ claims. 
Even when there are glaring inconsistencies in testimonies, Combs notes that the ‘[T]rial 
Chambers explain these away as products of the passage of time, the frailty of memory 
and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters’.70 
From a broader perspective, the adjudicatory process envisioned by these tribu-
nals is predicated on western common law (adversarial) and civil law (inquisitorial) 
traditions.71 Both traditions rely heavily on witness testimony and the judges (and the 
Tribunal as whole) have adopted these traditions as the modus operandi. Thus, by using 
the western trial form, ‘international criminal proceedings cloak themselves in the form’s 
garb of fact-finding competence, but it is only a cloak, for many of the key assumptions 
that underlie the Western trial form do not exist in the international context’.72 
As noted earlier, the UN Security Council granted the judges of the two ad hoc 
tribunals the power to draft (and amend) their own respective rules of evidence and 
procedure, which may have provided the perfect tool to rectify—or in Ladeur’s words, 
self-regulate—these anomalies. Moreover, the very design of the trial process (and even 
pre-trial investigation) was left up to the judges of the two tribunals to determine as they 
saw fit. Given these conclusions, what we have right now is a disconnect between the 
substantive evidence (based on witness testimonies) and the mandate of the tribunals to 
prosecute those with the gravest responsibility for the mass atrocities, whilst respecting 
the rights of the accused to due process. 
The changes to the rules are predicated, however, on efficiency and expeditious tri-
als that would not run up the costs of international justice. This disconnect is based on 
the bias of the judges (and the tribunals).73 The pro-conviction bias of the judges may 
possibly stem from their personal background and their expertise. Within the Rwan-
dan context, political affiliations signal to the tribunals the potential culpability of the 
accused. These factors ultimately lend support to the belief that the accused participated 
in the genocide, even without the ‘beyond-reasonable-doubt’ threshold given the faulty 
witness testimonies. 
REGULATORY CAPTURE: WHO’S IN AND WHO’S OUT?
The employees of these tribunals are central to the pro-conviction bias dealt with earlier. 
Judges are selected from a pool of candidates through the United Nations, and approved 
by the United Nations Security Council as set out by the Statute and the respective rules 
70 Ibid, 221.
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72 Combs (n 32) 179.
73 Ibid, 167–88, 221.
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of each tribunal. Most judges move from one tribunal to another given the scarcity of 
expertise in international criminal law.74 
The tribunal is staffed by United Nations employees (from legal associates and pros-
ecution attorneys to in-house translators). In this regard, there has emerged a class of 
international employees who work on ‘post-conflict justice issues and who maintain an 
itinerant lifestyle in pursuit of that work’, moving from one hotspot to another within 
these tribunals.75 For example, Elena Baylis tells the story of young aspiring activists and 
advocates trying to make a difference by transferring their social activist legal training 
from western institutions to conflict hotspots and international criminal institutions. 
These good intentions, however, are clouded by what Baylis demonstrates as the known 
unknowns.76 These known unknowns are characterised as a ‘lack of local knowledge 
of post-conflict settings, whether that is knowledge of the local legal system, local facts, 
local culture or any other relevant information’.77 Moreover, Baylis argues that these 
known unknowns are notoriously hard to deal with since there are issues of lack of tim-
ing, false expertise, complexity, and size of the local context. False expertise stems from 
the very nature of the work that is undertaken and the ability to transfer these skills to 
other hotspots. These international experts spend no more than two to three years at 
each tribunal as they follow the spread of international criminal justice. 
In this context, the role of experts within networks, contrary to Ladeur’s proposi-
tions, is not value neutral. David Kennedy’s insights indeed suggest that the background 
norms of institutions are more important in global governance than originally thought.78 
The political values of experts within the tribunals in effect shape the outcome of the 
process. These experts manage the background norms that permeate the value structure 
of the tribunals. As Kennedy has highlighted, what really matters at the global govern-
ance level is not what is in the foreground (the tribunals) or the context (Rwanda and 
the Former Yugoslavia). Rather,
the work of the background has colonized the foreground and the context. The foreground 
increasingly seems a mere spectacle—a performance to which we attribute agency, interest 
and ideology. At the same time, it is difficult to locate elements of context, which are not con-
structed by people managing background norms and institutions. Indeed, the foreground and 
the context may well turn out to be effects of background practices.79 
It does matter that the judges and their experts have a pro-conviction bias, which may 
be rooted inherently in the way international law is constructed, as part of the civilising 
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mission.80 Lack of training and cultural competencies with regard to the local context 
has a significant influence on outcomes. This bias within the network does have a det-
rimental effect on those theorising about the possibility of Global Governance and the 
creation of spontaneous accountability within the global administrative space. The det-
riment, therefore, is that the regulatory capture of any network is potentially inevitable 
and represents one of the significant problematic features of Global Governance. 
CONCLUSION: THEORISING INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIDE OUT
The history of international law demonstrates that there are discrepancies between uni-
versal legal concepts, their rationality and their contemporary application. For example, 
Grotius’ attempts to curtail the raw power of the sovereign by creating new rules in the 
form of international law is a universal claim rooted in Eurocentrism.81 International 
legal historians, however, have revealed that international law, and sovereignty doctrine 
in particular, was used largely to regulate encounters between local inhabitants of the 
new world and the European colonisers.82 As international law evolved, moving away 
from natural law to positivism, a new field was concretised.83 Yet what is undeniable is 
that this development of international law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is 
closely tied to the continuation of colonialism and imperialism.84 By the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the accelerated drive of international law had resulted in an 
abundance of international institutions set up to deal with the world’s problems, such as 
delivering aid to those in need and dealing with health related issues. This created a new 
international space that necessitated describing and then theorising the international 
space, given the push of globalisation and the changing nature of the nation state. GAL, 
as part of the Global Governance debate, is one incarnation of these attempts to describe 
the existing international landscape using domestic understanding of administration as 
potentially embodied by administrative law that includes principles such as transparency 
and accountability, amongst others. 
International law scholars have used vast amounts of ink trying first to articulate, and 
subsequently to study and describe, the international legal order. The foregoing analysis 
suggests that Global Governance debates that attempt to describe the international legal 
architecture may succumb to a peripheral reading of international institutions. These 
characterisations do not adequately reflect the inherent realities of these institutions. 
The analysis focused on the recent field of GAL and Ladeur’s contribution to GAL, as a 
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possible distinct description of the international legal order. In so doing, this paper intro-
duced the ICTR as a case study to illustrate, on the one hand, how Global Governance 
and GAL may portray the contemporary international space that is seen by international 
scholars from a cursory top-down perspective. On the other hand, the analysis dem-
onstrated how conceptions of Global Governance broadly, and GAL specifically, elides, 
obscures and effaces the underlying context within the international legal order. 
More concretely, Professor Ladeur has made a significant contribution to our exist-
ing understanding of GAL as part of the Global Governance discussion. As highlighted 
earlier, Ladeur suggests that GAL must take account of administrative law’s postmod-
ernism and thus existing articulations of GAL must transcend notions of delegation, 
accountability and legitimacy as means to secure legitimacy within the global space. 
These concepts, Ladeur notes, are wedded to older understanding of the nation state 
that do not account for societal transformation. The new societal transformation, as part 
of the evolutionary process, has ushered in the creation of spontaneous accountability 
by networks. GAL’s focus, therefore, should not be on generating control of compli-
ance rules. Rather, by focusing on the entangled hierarchies and generating spontaneous 
accountability through the rise of networks, GAL can take postmodern understandings 
of administration and open up new vistas in Global Governance thinking. Ladeur uses 
environmental governance as a potential site to illustrate his articulation of GAL. What 
he ignores is that environmental protection regimes cannot simply adopt western state-
centric perspectives to protect environmental resources. Rather, context specific insights 
(for example indigenous knowledge and political economy claims) must be incorpo-
rated into the existing understandings of environmental protection.
In this regard, Ladeur is correct in pointing to the rise of networks and their potential 
to generate accountability. Yet what is undeniable, as illustrated by the ICTR case study, is 
that networks are susceptible to regulatory capture by special interest groups. The fore-
going examination of witness testimony and the role of experts within the ICTR reveals 
that special interests have managed to take over by insisting on prosecuting those most 
responsible for the crimes, even in cases where there is insufficient or unsound evidence 
to proceed. Such regulatory capture coincides with historical insights into the nature of 
international law and its potential for universalising specific narratives. For example, 
the sovereignty doctrine was forged to regulate the encounter between Europeans and 
uncivilised locals. The doctrine developed within a specific socio-political context in 
which European empires sought to control their newly acquired territories and inhab-
itants.85 Importantly, the origins of international law foster a specific ‘set of structures 
that continually repeat themselves at various stages in the history of the discipline’.86 
This particular dynamic of international law therefore encourages regulatory capture by 
emphasising specific sets of values and traditions. Arguably, Combs’ study drives home 
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the notion that there are explicit decisions being made on the ground which may push 
against and most often contradict the facts deployed by Global Governance experts, 
especially GAL scholars. 
Ultimately, these characterisations of international institutions and the various 
international regulatory bodies are missing the mark by focusing solely on the top-down 
perspective, rather than embracing the internal truths emblematic of these institutions. 
Depicting a very singular narrative that focuses on the facts, as witnessed by those in 
Berlin, Hamburg, London and New York, and theorising from this perspective may not 
yield any results that actually help us to understand the different political compromises 
involved and how these institutions are created and operate. The description of the 
international legal order cannot be a single story. 
